On “socialising empowerment”

Tsang Shu-ki (13/07/2003)

Given Hong Kong’s socio-political reality, one of the keys to the future, it seems to me, is that the awareness and activism of the public could be sustained (which is not guaranteed) and a widened and rationalised discourse is developed on a set of measures and policies to tackle the difficulties besetting Hong Kong.

In short, it is a process of “socialising empowerment” (or “empowered socialisation” if you like). The process goes beyond the concept of direct and “full” elections, which is more concerned with “taking power”. The latter begs the question of taking power by whom and for what? In a “parliamentary” game of limited choices, it would be the “career democrats” who benefit most. And history is full of examples that the majority of them would disappoint the people again. We don’t have to look far: just look across the Taiwan Strait.

The “removal” of Tung implies immediately the question of an alternative power centre, unless one is satisfied with the abstract rhetoric of “people’s power”. It is not surprising that Beijing is worried about that touchy issue. But as commentators have pointed out, an overwhelming majority of the demonstrators on 1^st July didn’t challenge the Mainland authorities.

Over-represented by the middle class and professionals, they were peaceful and rational; and that made the rally outstanding by any historical standard. Such quality should be kept and further developed: preferably in a multiple of burgeoning “power centers”---a literal realisation of “people’s power” outside the ineffectual legislature and the depressing administration. New political leaders, notably a few highly qualified lawyers with moderate views, have already emerged from the movement. More political groups should be established and discussions on Hong Kong’s future should thrive. This will be a vital aspect of the democratisation process in a broad sense.

Some have compared the rally to the beginning of another May 4 Movement. What happened in China after the real Movement in 1919? Did people take power immediately? Or even long after it? From a purely institutional point of view, the result was not a victory for democracy at all. But from a wider socio-political perspective, the empowerment of the Chinese people took on an entirely new dimension.

In Hong Kong, we must learn from those lessons. To tackle the constraints of the underdevelopment of our political elite and the heterogeneity of local ideologies, the formation of a stronger and less divided “civil society” is an important factor, if not a pre-requisite, to institutional democratisation that delivers. The emergence of non-antagonistic potential power centres in society would ease the mind of some of the over-sensitive officials in the north.

The two aspects of societal empowerment and institutional democratisation are theoretically interacting. But with the mess that exists, would there be enough capable people to board the old ship, or a “new” ship in the near future? The incorporation of “moderate democrats” in a reshuffled Tung administration (whatever that means) could backfire: it might result in more “politics of frustration” and generate further divisions. Nevertheless, the underdevelopment of political elite does not imply that there is nothing much to do, as some parties of vested interests argue. Far from it, there is a lot of “preparatory work” to be done. It is just that we should not focus on quickly changing the election systems and the core of “power” in CGO alone. To put it dramatically, let the core of the apple continue to rot! What we should do is similar to “surrounding the city from the countryside”.

The recent two cases of the public successfully challenging the government in the court, concerning the reclamation of the harbour and the determination of public housing rentals, are actually landmarks, which are worthy of our serious attention. They show the drawbacks of bureaucratic insensitivity and exclusivity in policy making. Many more such issues are at stake and the government should be further pressurised on both fronts: ratifying past mistakes and opening up future decision processes. A weak government as this should not be allowed to proceed as usual.

Other than campaigning for the extension of democracy in the elections of the legislature and the CE, we should also fight for the devolution of power in the management of our daily life, including the issues of public health and the environment, as I have discussed in another piece (債務償還、質變與掌權). The former is concerned with “taking power to govern”, while the latter is more with taking “power off the government”. A large metropolitan city needs not be governed in such a centralised manner as Hong Kong is.

People should be empowered, formally and informally, and they should also socialise through interactions, with a view to reduce (but not to eliminate) their differences and smooth out extreme positions. This is what political economists have called a “mature political culture”, which can help to overcome the so-called “voting paradox” (for the basic concepts, see my microeconomics lecture notes).

There is hope that with a process of active participation a majority view on Hong Kong’s political development, including the relationship between the SAR and the central government, as well as policies to handle our socio-economic tasks would emerge. Institutional democratisation on that basis is both desirable and feasible. It is also something that Beijing should find tolerable.

But again, the lack of democracy is not the sole cause of Hong Kong’s present maladies. Hence even democratisation in the broad sense would only go some way in addressing our difficulties. As I said, “substance matters as much as form.” The crux of the problem is for the Hong Kong people to collectively show a quality that can enable us to weather the storm and to engineer a phoenix-like rise. Of that, I am afraid, the real test is yet to come.

論「社會化掌權」

曾澍基 (13/07/2003)

基於香港的社會政治現實，我認為未來的關鍵之一在於維持公眾的醒覺和活躍(這並非必然)，以及發展廣闊與理性的溝通境域，針對正困擾香港的難題，討論一系列回應的措施和政策。

簡而言之，它是一個「社會化掌權」(或者是「掌權式社會化」)的過程。它超越了直接及「全面」選舉的概念。後者對「取得政權」更為關心；但問題是由誰來取得政權？取得政權又有何作為？在有限選擇的「議會」遊戲中，最大得益者將是那些「職業民主派」。而歷史充滿着他們事後使人民失望的例子。我們不須看得太遠：看看台灣海峽對岸便知。

董建華「下台」的即時含義是權力向另一中心轉移。這問題不容逃避，除非我們滿足於抽象的「人民力量」口號。北京對此敏感議題感到擔憂並不奇怪。但是，正如論者指出，絕大多數在七月一日遊行示威的人士都沒有向大陸政權挑戰。

他們之中，中產階級和專業人士比例偏高，表現亦很和平理性；以任何歷史標準來衡量，「七一大遊行」都是傑出的。如此的素質量應該保持，最好能在多元的「權力中心」內進一步發展。於失效的立法會與使人氣餒的政府之外，這是「人民力量」的真正體現。新的政治領袖已經從運動中冒出頭來，包括相當高資歷及觀點溫和的律師。民間應成立更多的政治團體，而關於香港未來的討論應該熱烈進行，這將屬廣義民主化過程的重要環節。

一些論者把遊行比作另一次五四運動的開始。1919年的運動在中國發生後，人民立時甚至很久以後有執掌政權嗎？從純粹制度的觀點來看，結果完全不屬民主的勝利。但是，從較寬的社會政治角度來分析，中國人民的掌權歷程已進入另一全新的層次。

在香港，我們要記取教訓。為了紓解本地政治精英人才短缺和民眾意識形態分歧的制約，有需要形成一個較強及分歧較少的「民間社會」。它是制度民主化的重要因素，若非先決條件的話。非對抗性而有潛質的多元權力中心於社會上出現，亦可令到北方一些過份敏感的官員安心。

社會化的掌權與制度的民主化理論上互相影响。但面對目前的爛攤子，有多少能仁志士肯踏上舊船，或者在短期內改裝的「新」船？將董班子改組，吸納所謂「溫和民主派」，結果可能是另一輪的「氣餒政治」，引致更大分化。不過，這並非像某些既得利益者所說，香港缺乏政治精英，故此無甚作為。剛好相反，「預備工作」多的是。關鍵在於，我們不應把迅速改變選舉制度和政府權力中心當作努力的唯一焦點。戲劇化地說：就讓蘋果的核心爛下去吧！我們要做好的：類似「鄉村包圍城市」。

最近兩宗市民在法院成功地挑戰政府的個案(分別有關港口填海和公屋租金訂定的政策)，值得我們注視。它們反映了政府制訂政策時官僚主義式的麻木及排他性。更多如此的課題將會出現，而政府應該在兩方面受到進一步的壓力：令它糾正以往的錯誤和開放未來的決策。一個如此弱勢的政府不應被容許若無其事地繼續混下去。

除了爭取議會和特首選舉的民主化之外，我們也應該廹使政府放權，讓我們有更大的自主去管理日常生活，包括公共衞生及環境(請參考我另一文章：債務償還、質變與掌權)。前一方面關乎「取得政權統治」，後一方面則較集中從政府「拿走權力」。一座像香港的大都會實在無必要以這樣集權的方式來管治。

民眾須在制度內外都掌握權力，而且他們亦應通過交往來社會化，以期減少 (但不是要消除)彼此之間的不同意見，並調和極端的傾向。政治經濟學者認為這是「成熟政治文化」的特徵；有助克服所謂「投票吊詭」(基本概念，請參看我的微觀經濟學講課筆記)。

通過市民的活躍參與，香港有希望孕育出關於政治發展(包括特區與中央政府的關係)以及處理社會經濟挑戰的政策的多數意見。在那個基礎上推行的制度民主化既是理想，亦屬可行；它也應該為北京所容忍。

不過，應再強調，缺乏民主不是香港當前病患的唯一起因。故此，甚至廣義的民主化也只能在某程度上紓解問題。我曾說過：「內容與形式同樣重要。」關鍵是香港人須集體顯示我們抵受風暴和火鳳凰再生的素質。那一種考驗，我恐怕還未到臨。