Half a million on the march

People have spoken. If half a million people took to the street in a very hot afternoon and yet you are not convinced, you will probably never be convinced by anything. For every person who participated, add at least five who shared his or her misgivings and discontents but for various reasons did not show up. Which amounted to almost 50% of the local population. In a democratic system, the government would have no chance of persisting doggedly in any wrongdoing.

How a government could become so unpopular for so long that even very gentle citizens felt compelled to speak out loud must be some sort of a mystery, at least a very complicated story. But there is no doubt about one fact: the behaviour of the participants in the 1^st July rally was simply exemplary, again confirming what I have described as Hong Kong’s quality advantages. Which were already amply demonstrated in the fight against SARS. Hong Kong people certainly deserve a better system and a more competent and responsive government.

Beyond credulity. One would be excused for nurturing a bit of naive thinking: i.e. after the first wave of SARS had subsided, the Tung Administration would have taken bold measures to address the grievances of the population and capitalised on the revealed qualities of the people in moving Hong Kong out of the doldrums. Officials obviously committing policy errors in the SARS crisis should be disciplined; and an independent investigation commission established. Instead, Hong Kong became the only infected area in Asia where no government bureaucrats had to step down or even sideways. Moreover, the manner that the SAR Government handled the controversies about the statutory provisions for Article 23 of the Basic Law bordered on outright arrogance. How could a weak government like this have behaved as if it were a strong one? A psychologist is in a better position to analyse the question.

No kidding. The morning after, I was back in my office. When I entered the pantry to get some water, one of the cleaning staff attending our floor asked me, “Mr. Tsang, do you think that the removal of Tung would cure Hong Kong’s problems?” I paused for a few seconds, and then answered, “I rather doubt it.” “I thought so,” came her response. “But he has to go.” She added. I smiled.

Such is the quality of our people. Most of us have little illusion about any quick fix to the serious difficulties that the community has to face. It is not down to one person to stir up a terrible mess. And many still regard Tung as a “good old man”---he is just not the right stuff to be the Chief Executive of the SAR. But in a crisis like this, political leadership is crucial. Yet time and again we have been disappointed and frustrated. How are we supposed to have confidence that things would not turn worse, much worse, if no significant political changes are forthcoming?

A crucial test. Personally, I am quite pessimistic about the future. As I said in the PowerPoint file “Economics of SARS in Context”, the economy alone is confronted with three types of challenges: (1) the uncertainty of epidemics; (2) a possible downwave in the US; and (3) the painful process of structural transformation. Far-sighted but firm responses are required if we are to weather the storm; and some of the policies would not be popular. That’s one reason why I tinkered with the concept of “tutelage” by a “failed” but at least well-intentioned government to take the blame (“Crisis and leadership change”). Alas, under the present political reality, this might turn true by default! However, the other side of the matter is that there need to be competent people within the government who can effectively do the jobs, and Tung has to let them perform (while taking any blame himself).

The trouble is that with Tung as the CE, would there be a sufficient number of capable people who are willing to take the risk for the public good? Of course, a similar question applies even if Tung is gone---suppose he voluntarily steps down---and leaves behind the mess. It will be a crucial test of the quality of the elite in Hong Kong.

But should they be condemned if they hesitate or refuse to serve?